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Chapter 7

Gendered risks of retirement
The legal governance of defined
contribution pensions in Canada
Mary Condon *

INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines how the governance of new employer-sponsored pension arrangements in Canada mediates the relationship between gender and
discourses of economic risk. It considers the role played by these pension
regimes in maintaining gendered forms of ﬁnancial self-governance and economic insecurity. It asks whether evolving precepts of pension regulation
assist or hinder women who wish to resist the disciplinary reach of policy
restructurings in the employer-based pension sector.
The argument will be made in this chapter that legal governance of deﬁned
contribution (DC) pensions is an example of a shift away from ‘command
and control’ forms of regulation, and that one of its eﬀects is to redistribute
economic risks away from employer pension sponsors and towards
employees, particularly lower-paid women. The central objective is to examine, from a feminist point of view, several speciﬁcally legal devices for the
management of employee ﬁnancial risk in a DC context. A core feature of a
DC pension is that it typically allows workers to make decisions about where
pension contributions should be invested. At one level, the ability to make
choices, and a governance regime facilitating this, is broadly consistent with
feminist emancipatory goals. Choice making in this context replaces olderestablished, more paternalistic notions of ﬁduciary duties1 owed to workers
by employers or pension trustees. Indeed ﬁduciary duties employed as legal
responsibility devices in various contexts have been critiqued from a feminist
perspective (Gabaldon 1995; Nedelsky 1989). However, I argue that the
detail of how this shift to facilitating choice making might play out in
the pension context needs to be interrogated closely, particularly with regard
to the push to embrace risk in order to self-provide ﬁnancial sustainability.
* Osgoode Hall Law School. The author acknowledges the research support of SSHRC as well
as the hospitality of the Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto.
1 A ﬁduciary duty is usually taken to mean the requirement to act with loyalty, good faith and in
the best interests of the person. or group to whom the duty is owed
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In particular, feminist legal analysis of evolving pension governance may
need to take more seriously research ﬁndings from disciplines such as
social psychology and feminist economics, to the eﬀect that structures of
rationality and decision making may themselves be gendered, particularly
with respect to the advantages and disadvantages of risk taking (Finucane
et al 2000; Strauss 2006b). The argument is that perceptions of degrees
of risk are correlated with the levels of vulnerability and control experienced
by those assessing the risk (Finucane et al 2000). As Slovic (1999: 693)
expresses it:
. . . race and gender diﬀerences in perceptions and attitudes point toward
the role of power, status, alienation, trust, perceived government
responsiveness, and other sociopolitical factors in determining perception and acceptance of risk. To the extent that these sociopolitical factors
shape public perception of risks, we can see why traditional attempts to
make people see the world as White males do, by showing them statistics
and risk assessments, are often unsuccessful . . .
The claims made in this chapter will be addressed by ﬁrst placing the evolving
legal regime for DC pensions in Canada in larger political economy perspective. Here the argument is that this macro perspective betrays gendered
underpinnings. Then the chapter will focus in on the legal regime for DC
pensions in Canada, in order to demonstrate how it is likely to reinforce
gender disadvantage, and how it is based on a valorization of forms of
choice making that is not sensitive to gendered rationalities about risk.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS
It is widely accepted in the pension and labour studies literatures that there
has been a shift in the employer-based retirement income sector away from
‘deﬁned beneﬁt’ (DB) forms of pension provision and towards DC plans.2
2 This shift has been occurring at varying paces in diﬀerent countries. In the US, ‘more than
four-ﬁfths of all workers covered by employer-sponsored pension plans are participants in DC
plans’ (US Department of Labor). In the UK, ‘over 60% of deﬁned-beneﬁt schemes have been
closed or replaced by deﬁned-contribution schemes’ (Ring 2003: 67). However, in Canada, ‘the
vast majority of DC plans are with small or medium-sized employers, representing less than
$10 million in assets each’ (Sharratt 2003: 31, 36). In 2004, the Joint Forum of Financial
Market Regulators noted that over three million Canadians belong to Capital Accumulation
Plans (CAPs), which have approximately $60 billion in assets, and over 80 per cent of which
allow members to make investment choices (Joint Forum 2004 Backgrounder). Figures
from the same year indicate that there are slightly more DC plans in Canada than there are
DB plans (7,507 of the ﬁrst type and 7,014 of the second), though more than
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In the ﬁrst type, employers remain liable for funding a calculable ‘pension
promise’ to workers, while in the second, employers undertake only to make
speciﬁc contributions, with the ultimate ﬁnancial outcome for the worker
being largely dictated by how well the employers’ and/or employees’ contributions perform when invested in various ﬁnancial products. In a DC pension, individual employees usually make the decisions about where to invest
the contributions. In contrast, investment decision making in the traditional
DB format is centralized in the hands of pension trustees who make decisions
for the fund collectively. A vigorous debate exists in the political economy
literature as to whether the genesis of this policy shift is in the ‘shareholder
primacy’ thesis of corporate organization (i.e. that corporations are more
interested in providing short-term returns to shareholders than beneﬁts to
employees), or alternatively in the moral economy of state-sponsored neoliberalism (which valorizes autonomous, individualized choice making and
market-based service provision) (Cutler and Waine 2001).
In earlier work I have argued that the political economy of the shift to DC
pensions is gendered at many levels.3 Gendered features of this shift include
foundational understandings of the relationship between periods of productive work and ‘non-productive’ work (in retirement or for childcare) in individuals’ life cycles. The idea that provision for retirement is based on a model
of continuous full-time employment for a 30- or 40-year period followed by a
shorter period of retirement does not tend to capture the complicated nature
of the relationship between ‘productive’ labour and caring work in women’s
lives (Bezanson and Luxton 2006). Meanwhile, considering the situation of
women in labour markets only, there remains ample data demonstrating that
women remain more likely to have lower incomes and to engage in nonstandard employment4 than men, with adverse consequences for avoiding
poverty in old age (Vosko 2000). Such economic disadvantage in employment
situations has a knock-on eﬀect for ﬁnancial well-being in retirement, once it
is assumed that labour market involvement is meant to provide the bulk of
that ﬁnancial provision. This empirical data about the gendered nature of the
labour market remains relevant despite the need now to be cognisant of the
fact that a new gender order has been evolving over the last several decades
(Cossman and Fudge 2002). This new gender order requires that the category
of gender be disaggregated, according to the extent to which women interact
with the labour market.5 The conclusion to be drawn from this material is

80 per cent of all pension plan members remain in DB plans (Kaplan 2006: 3). The preponderance of employees still covered by DB plans are in the public sector, with less than 25 per cent
of private sector workers in Canada being members of DB plans (SEI Canada 2006: 2).
3 Condon (2006).
4 That is, not full-time, full-year.
5 In other words, those women who are streaming into professionalized, full-time, high-paying
jobs are not necessarily economically disadvantaged compared to men.
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that turning to pension structures that reduce responsibilities on employers
and heighten the need for workers to interact directly with investment markets has the capacity to create ‘new forms of gender inequality, new forms of
discursive discipline, and new forms of gendered insecurity’ (Condon 2006).

THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PENSION PROVISION
Pension policy restructuring in the employer sector is itself embedded in a
broader institutional and policy context concerning how to provide adequate
levels of retirement income for all citizens. In earlier work I and others have
canvassed how the discourses undergirding entitlements to retirement income
have changed from being centred around norms of collective citizenship
rights to being premised on neoliberal individualized responsibility (Miller
and Rose 1990; Condon 2002). Speciﬁcally, I have argued that in the current
era of neoliberalism, the role of the state with respect to retirement income
has shifted away from a focus on the direct provision of economic beneﬁts
and towards developing the institutionalized and regulatory structures within
which privatized retirement takes place. In that sense, the role of the state has
become increasingly focused on strategies of risk management, often by way
of reshaping regulatory norms (O’Malley 1998; Moss 2002; Braithwaite
2000). More speciﬁcally, Strauss has recently argued that various welfare
states may be plotted along a continuum, according to the extent to which
they seek to ameliorate what she calls ‘gender inequality risk’ (Strauss 2006a).
Examples of welfare state policies that address gender equality risks include
‘sex discrimination and equal pay legislation, individual and household systems of taxation, aﬃrmative action programmes . . . and the treatment of
unpaid caring work by pension regimes’ (Strauss 2006a: 11). It is notable that
many of these risk management strategies do not involve the direct payment
of beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally in relation to pensions, Strauss argues that there are
‘four interrelated risk dimensions associated with gender’. These are ‘the
public/private mix and commitment to redistribution, basis of entitlement,
treatment of unpaid work and caring, and access to income’ (ibid: 13). While
the preoccupation of this chapter is more directly with the role of the ‘private’
employment sector rather than the state in ameliorating pension risk based
on gender, it is clear that issues of the basis of pension entitlement and the
mix of public and private provision of retirement income are central to the
analysis of the legal governance of gender-based pension risk in Canadian
labour markets.
Yet, it is true that Canada’s uptake of Keynesianism after the Second
World War was still organized around the idea that direct public provision of
individual beneﬁts would be supplemented signiﬁcantly by retirement beneﬁts payable by employers (Deaton 1989). In this sense, Canada is more closely
aligned with the UK than any other European country plotted on Strauss’s
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continuum of national pension regimes (Strauss 2006a). There is a universal
state-provided retirement beneﬁt (Old Age Security) as well as a further
retirement amount payable to all who participated in the paid labour force on
the basis of contributions made by employers and workers (Canada Pension
Plan). However, these two beneﬁts taken together are expected to provide only
35 per cent of pre-retirement income for those earning the Canadian average
wage or less. Any retirement income beyond this must come from a third tier
of beneﬁts payable by individual employers or personal investment resources.
Importantly, this third tier has always been assumed to be voluntary on the
part of employers. Thus, individual employers will provide employer-speciﬁc
pension beneﬁts (either DB or DC) only if they consider it beneﬁcial to
retaining or attracting a qualiﬁed labour force. Nonetheless, the state has
attempted to provide incentives to employers to provide these beneﬁts, by
according favourable taxation status to money accumulated in so-called
registered pension plans (RPPs).

HOW IS LEGAL GOVERNANCE OF DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PLANS ACCOMPLISHED?
As noted above, the underlying premise from which the regulation of
employer-sponsored pension plans springs is one whereby there is no legal
requirement on employers to provide them at all. If the ﬁnancial or legal
obligations attendant on maintaining a plan become too onerous, employers
may terminate them, though detailed procedures must be followed to do
so (Kaplan 2006: Chapter 9). It is no surprise then that the legal discourse
surrounding the development of a regulatory framework for DC plans in
Canada emphasises so-called ‘decentred’ or voluntary forms of governance
such as codes of conduct, best practices, contractual arrangements and the
like.6 This is most obvious in the recent Guidelines for Capital Accumulation
Plans (CAPs), promulgated in Canada by the Joint Forum of Financial
Market Regulators (Joint Forum) in May 2004. These guidelines open with

6 The same philosophy underlies the recommendations of the 2001 Myners report in the UK,
(Institutional Investment in the UK: A Review) advocating codes of practice and robust
disclosure requirements (see Chap 11). An important feature of the evolving regulatory landscape is the way in which the growth of DC pensions provide a case study of global political
economic inﬂuences on law. Thus, ‘[G]lobally the DC pension plan industry is moving towards
more common regulatory standards and practices . . . global harmonization of DC governance practices assists multinational companies in introducing a common global DC risk
management approach, which is appropriate in each local jurisdiction’ (Felix 2005: 11). But
diﬀerences which persist in governance requirements as between diﬀerent countries, such as
Australia and the UK, illustrate the continuing importance of local variation here (DC Forum
December 2005 at 10 and 11).
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the sentiment that they are ‘intended to support the continuous improvement
and development of industry practices (s.1)’. Indeed, one of the stated revisions to the ﬁnal version of the CAP guidelines was that ‘any language suggesting mandatory requirements has been eliminated to reduce confusion
regarding the voluntary nature of the Guidelines’.7
In terms of the background to these guidelines, the Joint Forum worked
between April 2001 and May 2004 to develop a ﬁnal version. While it invited
written comments and held focus group sessions across the country, it is
notable that almost no workers provided input into the content of the guidelines.8 The diﬃculties for individuals in penetrating regulatory discourses
monopolised by repeat players and ‘experts’ has been well documented in the
literature, and is a particular diﬃculty for advocacy groups supporting marginalized interests. As Condon and Philipps argue with respect to various
arenas of economic governance, ‘a particular challenge is to increase the
participation of women in market governance and to problematize the use of
gender-blind analytic frameworks by economic policymakers’ (Condon and
Philipps 2005: 128).
The focus of the remaining sections of this chapter, then, is to unpack
further the legal and conceptual underpinnings of the Guidelines for Capital
Accumulation Plans (CAP guidelines), as the primary source of regulatory
structure for the operation of DC plans in Canada. In undertaking this examination, we should be alert to whether this legal regime – designed to facilitate
choice making – is sensitive to the possibility of gendered consciousness with
respect to risk.

HOW DO THE GUIDELINES WORK?

The players and their risks
The primary goal of these guidelines is to create a division of labour among the
roles and responsibilities of the plan sponsor (the employer), the service

7 Joint Forum of Financial Market Regulators, Summary of Stakeholder Comments and Regulators Responses From Consultations on Proposed Guidelines for Capital Accumulation
Plans, May 28 2004, at 2.
8 Twenty-six written responses were received to the Joint Forum’s request for comments, all
except one from organizations. While two comments were received from an organization called
Canada’s Association for the Fifty-Plus (CARP) and a third from a similar organization based
in Quebec, the rest came from institutions and organizations such as insurance companies,
investment funds, consulting ﬁrms and industry lobby groups. The Joint Forum held 12 focus
group sessions across the country, which were attended by plan sponsors, service providers and
pension plan members. It also met with ‘representatives of industry associations throughout
the consultation period’ (Backgrounder: 2).
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provider (typically, an insurance company) and the members (the employees).
Service providers are deﬁned as ‘any provider of services or advice required
by the CAP sponsor in the design, establishment and operation of a CAP
(s.1.1.3)’. Although sponsors may delegate their responsibilities to service
providers, they are initially responsible for setting up and maintaining the
pension plan, and ‘providing investment information and decision-making
tools to CAP members (s.1.3.1)’. Meanwhile, the guidelines make clear that
plan members are ‘responsible for making investment decisions within the
plan and for using the information and decision-making tools made available
to assist them in making those decisions’. Thus, in contrast to typical DB
pension plans, where investment allocation decisions for the plan are made by
fund trustees or delegated by them to investment managers, the regulatory
scheme for DC plans responsibilizes individual workers to engage in the
investment enterprise. Pension fund trustees, with their attendant legal ﬁduciary responsibilities to beneﬁciaries, are thereby removed from the equation
in a DC context (Davis 2004).
The guidelines further indicate that CAP members should ‘also consider
obtaining investment advice from an appropriately qualiﬁed individual in
addition to using any information or tools the CAP sponsor may provide’.
Not only is the obtaining of investment advice also downloaded to individual
employees, but the guidelines contain an explicit acceptance of the idea that
the information to be provided by the sponsor may be inadequate or subject
to a conﬂict of interest (s.1.3.3). In distributing to workers the risk of making
inadequate or inappropriate contribution investment decisions, and thereby
ending up with an inadequate pension, the guidelines take no account of
variation in the willingness or ability of individual workers to assume these
risks. No account is taken of the possibility that the willingness to assume
risk is itself gendered or racialized. We have noted above Slovic’s contention
that risk perceptions and attitudes reﬂect race and gender diﬀerences. This
gender-variable acceptance of risk occurs in a context in which there is no
enforcement mechanism provided by the guidelines themselves to assist with
the actual carrying out of the various responsibilities assigned to the relevant
parties.
According to the guidelines, responsibility to employees in a DC context
is satisﬁed if various disclosures are made to them. While this issue is discussed in more detail below, one stakeholder comment made in the process of
discussing these guidelines before they were implemented was that ‘[T]he
Guidelines underplay the aspect of risk. CAP sponsors should be required to
sensitise members to risk factors’. The Joint Forum’s response to this submission was that this issue was already adequately addressed in the guidelines,
pointing as an example to the disclosure to be provided to workers about the
characteristics of speciﬁc investment funds and the risks associated with
investing in them. This response is limited to issues of the risks associated
with speciﬁc investments, as opposed to more global risks of this form of
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pension provision or those that ﬂow from interaction with ﬁnancial markets
more generally. Revealingly, a participant in a 2005 discussion among sponsors of CAPs across Canada noted that
My focus is very much on the employee group. From a DC perspective,
getting them to clearly recognize what their role is vs. what their employer’s role is. I think too many of them still have the DB mindset that the
organization is going to look after them. We have to make sure they
know it might not be a happy ending.
(Richards 2005: 22)
These guidelines participate in and facilitate the assignment of a more intense
form of pension risk to workers. At the same time, they rely on assumptions
about the enthusiasm and competence with which employees will process
information about the relative risks of various investment vehicles, to enable
them to manage the possibility of increased ﬁnancial insecurity. No distinctions among workers in terms of how variables such as gender, race or class
impact on dispositions towards risk are contemplated in the overall legal
governance framework.

Constructing the universe of choice making:
employer selection of investment options
The idea of making investment choices is built into the very deﬁnition of a
CAP; we turn now to look in more detail at the parameters established by the
guidelines for making those choices. The ﬁrst signiﬁcant issue is that they
provide that it is the role of the sponsor to select the investment options to be
made available in the plan. While the guidelines indicate that the sponsor
should ‘ensure a range of investment options is made available’, it is clear that
from the perspective of the worker, the much-vaunted autonomy being
accorded to them is not unlimited, but constrained by prior choices made by
the sponsor. The guidelines further provide that some considerations that
should factor into the resulting menu of choices provided by the sponsor
include the fees9 associated with the various options, as well as the liquidity,10
degree of diversiﬁcation, and level of risk associated with them, and the
sponsor’s ability to review them. There is no encouragement provided to
sponsors to assess the levels of investment risk that employees would be
comfortable with assuming. The risk characteristics intrinsic to the investment options are given much more prominence than the risk characteristics of

9 Such as transaction or management fees.
10 The degree of liquidity of an investment refers to the ease with which it may be resold. An
investment that will be hard to resell is described as illiquid.
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the ultimate consumers of the options. Although reference is made to an
additional factor to be considered, which is described as ‘the diversity and
demographics of CAP members’, there is little attempt to explicitly acknowledge the worker’s gender or race as a relevant factor in decisions about the
menu of investment options to be made available (e.g. low risk versus high
risk) that will have the eﬀect of structuring individualized choice.11
As noted in the introduction, the psychological and behavioural economic
literature suggests that gender and race are signiﬁcant constructs for choice
making. In particular, feminist and behavioural economists have begun to
point to the masculinity of rational utility-maximizing decision paradigms
(Fineman 2005; Barber and Odean 2001). From the perspective of feminist
economics, England distinguishes between the ‘separative’ and the ‘soluble’
self. She argues that the ‘separative self, for whom relations are fundamentally
irrelevant, is the assumed homo economicus of the Market model’ (Nelson
and England 2002). For ‘economic man’, rationality is equated with the
maximization of wealth and the pursuit of self-interest. In contrast, ‘soluble’
selves – generally female or of a subordinate class or race – are those whose
‘individual identity is eﬀaced in the service of dependents and . . . allegedly
autonomous actors’ (Nelson and England 2002). While feminist economists
are interested in the way these stereotypes inﬂuence the methodologies and
value systems of economics as a discipline, as opposed to a claim that this is
an accurate description of how actual men and women behave, it suggests
that economically acceptable forms of rationality (especially in an investment
choice-making context) tend to be coded masculine rather than feminine.
Finally, the menu of investment options available in a DC plan may be
considerably circumscribed by the decision of the plan sponsor about involving a service provider. The guidelines make clear that in some cases, the
choice of a service provider will ‘deﬁne or limit’ the type of investment
options available to a plan. Again the discourse of choice is constrained by
the prior decisions of employer-sponsors, which may be made on utilitarian,
cost-eﬀectiveness grounds, or because of a pre-existing relationship with the
service provider. Workers may ultimately have some legal remedies to counteract the disadvantage of being provided with inadequate investment
choices. However, these will likely be mobilized only after ﬁnancial losses have
been sustained, and may do little to destabilize the prevailing ideology of the
beneﬁts of rational choice making in the mould of the masculinized ‘heroic
ﬁnancial risk-taker’ (de Goede 2004).

11 An earlier version of the guidelines had contained a reference to sponsors taking into
account ‘any preferences voluntarily indicated by members’ in designing overall investment
options. The ﬁnal version removed this reference to member preferences, substituting a
request to sponsors that they consider member complaints in subsequent monitoring of the
investment options provided (Stakeholder comments: 11).
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What forms of regulatory support for
choice making are provided?
It is generally acknowledged among pensions academics and industry participants that there is considerable resistance among large numbers of workers
to the alleged opportunities being provided via DC plans to make pensionrelated investment decisions (Mitchell and Utkus 2004; Blake 2003). The
suggestion has also been made that the appetite for engaging in this form of
decision making may vary culturally. David O’Brien, a vice president
with McCain Foods Ltd in New Brunswick, who oversees 34 pension plans in
56 countries, points out that ‘employees in many countries in which he has set
up DC plans are simply not interested in a vast array of investment options’
(Davis 2005: 9). He elaborates; ‘This live free or die mentality in the U.S. isn’t
replicated in a lot of countries around the world and employees don’t want
choice . . . In Brazil, for example, we had an awful time trying to get
employees to make decisions. They simply didn’t want to’ (ibid). As I
have argued elsewhere, the repeated ﬁnding in the burgeoning ‘personal
ﬁnance’ literature as well as academic research about the greater ‘risk aversion’ of women as compared to men may obscure the possibility that the
unwillingness to enter into the ﬁnancialized risk discourses required of individual workers is in fact an exercise of gendered agency rather than a sign of
lack of agency. In other words, this systemic unwillingness should be taken
seriously on its own terms as opposed to being considered a ‘problem’ to
be overcome.12 It is against this background that we should return to the
question of how the legal governance of CAP choice making is presently
accomplished.
Information disclosure
The CAP guidelines place a heavy emphasis on disclosure of information as
the predominant form of support to workers faced with investment choice
making. As Kaplan points out, the focus of the CAP guidelines is ‘to ensure
that employees in a deﬁned contribution plan have adequate and informed
access to investments. This is because the adequacy of that access can necessarily aﬀect the quality of the employee’s pension’ (2006: 107). The approach
taken here is quite consistent with the demise of traditional command and
control forms of regulation that might be more prescriptive in terms of the
menu of choices to be oﬀered to employees or that would require the provision of impartial advice. We have already noted the limitations of an
approach to information disclosure that focuses on disclosing the risks of
speciﬁc investments to workers, as opposed to a more global deﬁnition of

12 Condon (2006).
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pension risks as they relate to workers’ situations. Such a more holistic
approach to disclosure might emphasize the vulnerability of pension results
to the state of the ﬁnancial markets, or the relative ineﬃciency of disaggregating pension funds into individual plans as opposed to large collective
arrangements, or the emerging evidence that large groups of people, including many women, exhibit systematic tendencies to make decisions (or to
refuse to make them) that deviate from what the norms of rational utilitymaximizing would predict (Mitchell and Utkus 2004; Nofsinger 2005).
In the evolving regulatory regime of DC pensions constructed by these
guidelines, one of the primary responsibilities of sponsors to employees is
that of providing them with investment information and decision-making
tools. The guidelines indicate that the documentation provided should be
prepared using ‘plain language and in a format that assists in readability and
comprehension’. Section 3 elaborates that in deciding what types of information and decision-making tools sponsors should provide – a decision for them
to ultimately make – they should consider issues such as access to the internet
and the ‘location, diversity and demographics of the members’. Again there
might have been an opportunity here to consider whether information
retrieval and processing might be gendered, but the guidelines do not specifically advert to this. For example, do interactions and comfort levels with
technological tools for obtaining information about investment options vary
by gender? Do women employees systematically prefer speciﬁc types of
information about investments (for example, the labour practices of a multinational ﬁrm)? Should women with fewer ﬁnancial resources to invest in
retirement vehicles (as a result of lower wages) choose diﬀerent investment
strategies than more aﬄuent women or men? The issue of whether the information people want to make investment decisions or the ways in which they
use that information varies by gender is not raised.
Instead the guidelines suggest that examples of appropriate investment
information include glossaries explaining investment terms, information
about investing in diﬀerent types of securities (stocks and bonds), information about the ‘relative level of expected risk and return associated with
diﬀerent investment options’ and performance reports for any investment
funds oﬀered in the CAP. Meanwhile, examples of decision-making tools
include asset allocation models,13 retirement planning tools, projection tools
to help members determine contribution levels and project future balances,
and investor proﬁle questionnaires.
It is clear that the information considered relevant to members is considerably technocratic, despite the fact that empirical evidence suggests that
even professionalized pension trustees, to whom responsibility is delegated
to make centralized investment decisions for much larger pools of money in

13 Such as, for example, the allocation of contributions as between shares and bonds.
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a DB context, do not always have the expertise required to make those
investment decisions (Clark 2000). Again these forms of support for investment choice making seem of ambiguous value, when viewed through a feminist lens. While some feminists may applaud the apparent move away from
reliance on ‘expert knowledges’ inherent in the decline of centralized decision
making by trustees, it is unclear just how preferable it is for women who are
members of CAP plans to now be required to familiarize themselves with
similar technocratic information in order to make individualized pension
investment choices (Condon and Philipps 2005).
Nor do the guidelines address the issue of whether employers need to take
additional steps to encourage members to access these choice-making tools at
all. In this sense, employees are required to be self-motivated to take advantage of the information and assistance provided. Indeed, a frequently
expressed concern among sponsors is that they not be perceived by their
employees as providing them with pension advice. This is because the provision of advice might legally be considered to place the employer in a ﬁduciary
relationship with the employee, opening up the possibility that the sponsor
could be sued by plan members for inadequate advice giving. This fear is
argued by some commentators to have a chilling eﬀect on interactions
between sponsors and employees, and is a major source of the alleged ‘legal
risk’ faced by sponsors of DC plans (Kaplan 2006). It should be reiterated
that the broader context here is that one of the central eﬀects of a shift from
DB forms of pension provision to DC forms is the removal of traditional
ﬁduciary responsibilities formerly imposed on pension trustees, who have
traditionally exercised centralized investment decision making on behalf of
worker-beneﬁciaries as a group.
In the U.S., the damaging eﬀects on the pensions of Enron employees of
over-investment in Enron securities in their 401(k) plans, following the corporation’s bankruptcy has been documented (Blackburn 2002). In this context, it is not surprising that the Canadian guidelines provide that additional
information must be provided to members of a plan where securities of the
employer itself or a related party are included as an investment option. This
additional information includes ‘the risks associated with investing in a single
security’. Again the inﬂuence of the Enron debacle may possibly be discerned
in the regulation of the process of making transfers among investment
options in section 4.3.14 This process requires that sponsors should provide
members with information about ‘any restrictions on the number of transfers
among options a member is permitted to make within a given period,

14 As Blackburn describes it, part of the damage to Enron employees’ retirement portfolios
occurred because they were prevented by a company-imposed transfer freeze from selling the
Enron stock in their 401(k) plans, at the same time as Enron management were able to
dispose of their stock options. See Blackburn (2002).
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including any maximum limit after which a fee would be applied’. The
sponsor should also provide ‘a description of possible situations where transfer options may be suspended’. The possibility for sponsors to download
expenses associated with operating the pension plan is signalled by the guideline that the sponsor should indicate ‘all fees, expenses and penalties relating
to the plan that are borne by members’ including any costs that must be paid
when investments are bought and sold. By s.5.3 of the guidelines, sponsors
are required to provide performance reports for each investment fund to
members at least annually. This requirement for ongoing performance
reports, as well as periodic review by sponsors of the investment options
oﬀered (s.6.3), is taken by some commentators as an incentive to sponsors to
provide ‘more limited’ investment options in the future (Austin 2004). This
systematic eﬀect of how the guidelines are framed runs counter to the express
goal of introducing DC pensions, which is to expand the universe of pension
choice making available to workers.
Again, the question raised by the foregoing discussion is whether these
disclosure norms adequately respond to the insights from various academic
disciplines about actual decision-making practices. There is considerable
empirical data emerging from the ﬁeld of behavioural economics examining
the ways in which individual decision making is ‘skewed’ by phenomena like
framing, anticipatory regret, pride, endowment eﬀects,15 mental accounting,
decision paralysis and herd behaviour (Barber and Odean 2001; Nofsinger
2005). For example, Mitchell and Utkus argue that there are framing eﬀects
that result from the very detail of how a menu of options is superﬁcially
presented to employees, even beyond the design of the underlying investment
alternatives (Mitchell and Utkus 2004: 16). Mitchell and Utkus also report in
detail on research dealing with the importance of plan design in driving
participant decision making (ibid: 31). The ﬁndings of these types of investigations by cognitive psychologists all bear on the question of the extent to
which behaviour, such as investing behaviour, deviates from a rational proﬁtmaximizing model.
Meanwhile, from an economic geography perspective, Strauss has argued
that ‘the fact remains that people make decisions about their pensions in the
context of a web of social relations, networks, institutions, and structures of
power that for them constitute the “real world” of everyday life’ (Strauss
2006b). Thus she argues that the model of ‘assisted rationality’ that grounds
the provision of the type of technocratic information enumerated above
will not be enough to produce useful choice making for many workers.
More empirically, Greenwich Associates in the US report that ‘only a small
15 This is the idea that people often ‘demand much more to sell an object than they would be
willing to pay to buy it’ (Nofsinger 2005). Cognitive psychologists have run a number of
experiments designed to ﬁnd out why this is. One theory is that people are aﬀected by the
‘pain associated with giving up’ an object (ibid).
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fraction of participants [in 401(k) plans] use the Internet advice tools available to them’ (March 2005). The limits of education as a response to the need
to make DC choices are well articulated by Mitchell and Utkus (ibid: 32),
who point to endemic problems of inertia and lack of ‘rationality’.16 We have
noted above that the apparently applicable norms of rationality may themselves be gendered and racialized. Thus, for example, feminist critiques of
corporate and securities law have argued that the elevation of norms of
corporate proﬁt maximizing over other plausible goals of business activity
or organizational decision making (for example, social responsibility) is
gendered (Sparkes 2002; Gabaldon 1992; Condon 2000). This empirical
information casts doubt on the usefulness of regulating information disclosure as a risk management strategy for workers in a pension context. The
question from a feminist perspective is whether there are might be more
gender-aware forms of information disclosure that could be eﬀective to
mitigate the gender-based risk of economic insecurity in this area. A ﬁrst
step would be an openness to the possibility that the unwillingness to engage
in risk-based decision making is not because of a lack of education about
the positive features of risk, but rather a rejection of the premises of this
discourse.
Advice provision
The CAP guidelines explicitly acknowledge the possibility that employees
may need to access the ‘expertise’ of investment advisors in addition to utilizing the investment information provided by their employer. This decision is
presented as one for the individual employee to make, in a context in which
there is ‘no requirement that the plan sponsor test the investment knowledge
of its members’ (Austin 2004). Indeed, one of the eﬀects of the deployment of
DC plans is to produce an ‘increasing involvement of third-party vendors of
protection, investment and savings instruments’ (Shuey and O’Rand 2004:
464; Miller and Rose 1990).
The CAP guidelines exhort sponsors to periodically review service providers to whom they have referred members to help them make their investment decisions (s.6.2). Possible criteria to be used to frame such reviews
include any complaints arising from members about the service provider or
from the sponsor itself. However, the guidelines caution that ‘Because the
primary relationship of a service provider who provides investment advice is
with each member, it will not be possible or practical for the CAP sponsor to
directly review the quality of the advice being provided’. This creates an
accountability gap with respect to the practices of service providers in a

16 See also Stabile (2002).
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pension context, with employer sponsors assuming little oversight responsibility for providers’ interactions with employees.17
That the provision of advice by service providers may itself be gendered is
suggested by the following excerpt from the ﬁnancial planning literature. Yao
and Hanna state (2005: 75):
Although clients should ultimately decide whether they would like to
take a certain level of ﬁnancial risk, as a ﬁduciary of the client, a ﬁnancial planner has the duty to act in the client’s best interest – to evaluate
the client’s situation and make appropriate recommendations. It is the
job of ﬁnancial planners to educate clients (especially unmarried
females) who choose inappropriate investments with low ﬁnancial risk
about their need to take more risk; and to educate male clients who
have inappropriate investments with high risk about the importance of
preserving wealth.
The reference to the ‘education’ of clients about ‘appropriate’ risk levels
based on gender and wealth suggests that advice givers do not take seriously
the possibility that refusing to interact with risk discourses is a reasonable
exercise of investment rationality. Signiﬁcantly for the role of legal governance in the process of valorizing ﬁnancial risk taking, the gender-based disciplining of investors outlined in the above quote is justiﬁed by invoking a
ﬁduciary duty imposed on ﬁnancial planners with respect to their clients. In a
DC world the ﬁduciary duty of ﬁnancial planners operating within the ﬁnancial services industry is substituted for a similar duty that used to govern
employers themselves in their pension dealings with workers.
Sponsor monitoring
An important aspect of the Canadian CAP guidelines is the exhortation to
plan sponsors to engage in periodic review of their service providers, their
investment options, their records maintenance and the decision-making tools
provided to members. It is clear, however, that, for example, with respect to
reviews of the adequacy of service providers, it is for the sponsor to decide
what action to take in the event that a provider fails to meet the sponsor’s
expectations. Thus, the accountability of service providers is downloaded to
employers rather than being regulated centrally, in a context of an ongoing
business relationship that is more consensual and contractually oriented than
the traditional regulatory command and control model would be. We have
seen already that this decentred monitoring of service providers is considered

17 Kaplan takes a somewhat diﬀerent view of the employers’ exposure to claims for negligent
misrepresentation here. See Kaplan 2006: 368–370.
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particularly important where the employer has engaged the service provider
to provide investment advice to employees. Meanwhile, the guidelines suggest
that reviews of investment options provided by the plan should be undertaken at least annually, though again no further guidance is provided to
sponsors as to whether or what action to take if particular investment options
are no longer considered maintainable. This model creates incentives to
streamline the investment choices being oﬀered, since fewer choices mean less
employer resources devoted to monitoring; nor is any direction provided as to
the consequences of inadequate monitoring.
Whither fiduciary duties?
A noteworthy issue in the contemporary legal regulation of DC pensions in
Canada is the ambiguity associated with the treatment of ﬁduciary responsibilities towards employees. Traditionally, in a DB form of pension plan, it is
clear that the trustees of a pension fund have a ﬁduciary responsibility to
maximize the interests of the employee-beneﬁciaries.18 Where employees
make investment decisions pertaining to their own pension account, the
trustees’ ﬁduciary responsibility to make appropriate investment decisions on
behalf of employees is removed. It may even be speculated that the removal
of the legal liability risks associated with being a pension fund trustee is one
of the subsidiary purposes of the shift from DB forms of pension provision
to DC forms. Yet, as Kaplan notes in his contemporary treatment of Canadian
pension law, it is possible that legal decision makers may ﬁnd there to be
residual ﬁduciary responsibilities expected of employer sponsors in a DC
context. This concern on the part of Canadian employers is heightened by the
contrast with the legal construction of DC plans in the US, where the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) speciﬁcally provides that no ﬁduciaries have any liability for any losses incurred in plans that
permit participants to exercise control over the assets in their individual
accounts. No such ‘safe harbour’ removing participant-directed pension
plans from the ﬁduciary realm exists in Canadian pension law, nor is it
adverted to in the CAP guidelines.
Thus, Kaplan locates the sources of continuing legal risk for employers in
the uncertainty surrounding ﬁduciary liability for both inadequate plan
communication and inadequate investment choice. Similarly, Ahing argues
that ‘DC plan sponsors may continue to face risks arising in at least 4 primary
areas (1) insuﬃcient plan information provided to members (2) incorrect plan

18 Though the extent of that responsibility in the context of a DB plan, and in particular
whether it may facilitate the making of fund investment decisions so as to achieve corporate
social responsibility goals is currently the subject of intense academic and legal debate. See
Davis (2004); Yaron (2001); Cowan v. Scargill [1985] 1 Ch D 270, [1984] 2 All ER 750.
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information provided to members (3) improper choice of service provider in
delegating responsibilities (4) insuﬃcient monitoring of those service providers’.19 Even more speciﬁcally, does having a default investment option for
employees who do not exercise their own choices create the possibility of
liability for the sponsor who selected it? The argument would be that having a
default option (e.g. a low risk, low return money market fund) presumes that
the investor is not making her or his own choices, and opens up for legal
scrutiny the adequacy of the option created by the sponsor (Benney 2004).
The format this legal scrutiny would take is likely to ﬂow from litigation
engaged in by a group of employees as a class, alleging that the employer had
breached a ﬁduciary duty to them.
In this apparent atmosphere of uncertainty as to the application of
residual ﬁduciary responsibility norms to employer sponsors, the question
that might be raised from a feminist perspective is whether the legal device of
creating a ﬁduciary relationship to mitigate worker pension risk is one to be
supported or rejected for its gender-based consequences. Is ﬁduciary
responsibility (either of employers in a DC context or trustees in a DB context), as a legal device for the management of risk, to be preferred over more
enlightened forms of information disclosure? The argument of this chapter
has been that women and minorities are more likely to be economically disadvantaged by the ideology of individualized, technocratic choice making
that underlies the shift to DC pensions. Yet some problems from a feminist
perspective with the invocation of protective ﬁduciary norms should also be
ﬂagged. These include the dangers of paternalism, centralization of power,
excessive reliance on expert knowledge, the privileging of some interests over
others, as well as the possibility that ﬁduciaries’ conﬂicts of interest will in
fact inﬂuence their decision making (Gabaldon 1995: 19–20; Davis 2004).20
We have also noted above the way in which ﬁduciary duties may be invoked as
a reason for ‘educating’ women to accept more risk in pension decision
making. This issue of which legal risk management strategy is preferable
for women is one that should be taken seriously by feminists engaging in
gender-based advocacy in the retirement context.

CONCLUSION
At a material level, the gendered risks of pensions are ultimately deeply connected to persistent inequalities in labour markets. The shift to DC pensions
is gendered in that it removes economic security from vulnerable, lower-paid

19 Ahing (2004).
20 For a detailed non-feminist case in favour of paternalism in the context of DC plans, see
Stabile (2002).
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workers, and lauds individualized and masculinized risk taking, while at the
same time reducing the ﬁnancial risk exposure of employers. Emerging legal
norms – as exempliﬁed by the CAP guidelines – that govern the allocation of
material risks among employers, service providers and employees, can be seen
to promote ﬂexibility and choice for employers rather than workers. They are
light on substantive regulatory requirements to be fulﬁlled by employers, and
backstopped mainly by the possibility of workers launching suits for damages as a result of negligence or breach of ﬁduciary duty.
At the discursive level, the prevailing legal conceptual universe tends to
support the idea of the individual heroic risk taker, by attempting to situate
risk taking in the context of partial and decontextualized information disclosure, rather than to oﬀer alternatives to those employees, especially
women, who do not wish to participate in the discourse of risk taking (Peggs
2000; Strauss 2006b). But not participating in decision making means that
the locus of decision making shifts elsewhere, either back to trustees, or to
employers. Presented with the option of the capacity to choose or paternalistic choice making on her behalf by others, many feminists would be likely to
support choice over paternalism. The question being raised in this chapter
is whether this approach is still the right answer in the contemporary world
of pension provision. Thus, alternative approaches for feminist advocacy
could include either agitating for more eﬀective gender-aware support for
choice making and expanding the categories of ‘rational’ decision making,
cautiously reopening the debate about the merits of creating ﬁduciary relationships among employers or trustees and employees, or, more radically,
problematizing the foundational and deeply gendered link between labour
market participation and adequate retirement security.
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